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Abstract 
This paper argues that the new permanent European rescue fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), should 
be provided with a liquidity backstop by having it registered as a bank – and be treated as such by the European 
Central Bank. If the crisis were to become acute again, the ESM would stand ready to intervene in secondary 
markets, potentially with almost unlimited amounts of funding. Access to central bank financing will be crucial in a 
future crisis, because in such a crisis risk aversion is likely to be extreme, and even the ESM might not be able to 
raise at very short notice the huge sums that might be required to prevent a breakdown of the financial system. 
Hundreds of billions of euro might be needed just to top up the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal – and 
Spain and Italy may require more than a thousand billion euro. Sums of this order of magnitude cannot be raised 
quickly by a new institution. Simply increasing the headline size of the ESM might thus be of little use. 
The ‘ESM-bank’ (effectively a European Monetary Fund) would be subject to the same rules that apply to all other 
banks and the ECB would accept only high-quality collateral from it. The ECB could abandon its programme of 
purchasing peripheral government bonds and it would retain the final say on whether to provide liquidity to the 
ESM. Thus, the ECB would remain in control of central bank money supply and its role would be restricted to the 
classic functions of ensuring price stability and acting as a lender of last resort for banks. The management of 
external and internal imbalances within the euro area would be left to the ESM under the supervision of the finance 
ministers.  
Introduction: Sovereigns like banks 
Canaries used to be kept in coal mines because 
they die faster than humans when exposed to 
dangerous gases. When the birds stopped 
singing, the miners knew that it was time to gear 
up the emergency procedures. Greece, as it turns 
out, was the eurozone’s canary. In 2010, the 
canary was resuscitated, and a small rescue 
mechanism was set up which was activated a 
few more times to revive a further canary or two 
– but beyond this, the warnings were ignored. 
The miners kept on working. They were 
convinced that the canaries had overeaten and 
just needed to go on a diet to get well again. 
But the problems of Greece should have also 
been seen as the first manifestation of a general 
problem, namely that the global crisis was 
spreading to public debt as capital markets 
refused to refinance excessive levels of public 
debt, especially in the eurozone whose members 
could no longer rely on central bank support. 
The Maastricht Treaty explicitly ruled out any 
form of ‘monetary financing’ for governments. 
This was done to safeguard the independence of 
the ECB and thus ensure that governments 
would be forced to follow sound fiscal policies. 
While this prohibition of financing deficits via 
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safeguard price stability, it can nevertheless 
create a problem when risk aversion becomes so 
great that even solvent borrowers can no longer 
roll over their debt. In such a situation, liquidity 
becomes a key factor, both for the sovereign and 
the banking system. 
For the sovereign, the problem can be 
summarised as a maturity mis-match: a 
government has long-term assets (flow of tax 
revenues) and liabilities of a much shorter 
duration. A country with a balanced budget 
would normally be considered solvent even if 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is 100%, because with a 
balanced budget that ratio will decline towards 
zero as long as GDP grows in nominal terms. 
However, even if the average maturity of 
government debt is 8 years (rather conservative 
and almost the case for Italy), the same country 
has to refinance 12.5% of its GDP every year – a 
sum that far exceeds what even the strongest 
government could hope to finance out of a 
surplus. This implies that any government could 
immediately become insolvent if investors refuse 
to roll over the debt coming due. This is exactly 
the same mechanism as operates in a bank run. 
A bank typically has long-term assets (loans) but 
short-term liabilities (deposits). If all the 
depositors want their money back at the same 
time, the bank will not be able to liquidate its 
loan portfolio immediately (Diamond & Dybwig, 
1983). 
The danger of a run on government debt does 
not exist for a country with its own national 
currency (as long as government debt is in local 
currency) because then the national central bank 
can provide the liquidity needed to keep the 
sovereign solvent in the short run even in case of 
a total investors’ strike. The potential for bank 
runs and their wide spread occurrence during 
the 1930s was the main reason why central banks 
became the lender of last resort for banks. Within 
the euro area, national governments, similarly to 
banks, need a liquidity back-up which can be 
provided only by the ECB. Any liquidity 
backstop mechanism – whether for banks or for 
sovereigns – requires by definition a distinction 
between insolvency and illiquidity.  
For banks the final decision is usually taken by 
the fiscal authorities. We argue (see Gros & 
Mayer, 2011) that one should follow the same 
approach also for euro area sovereigns. 
Moreover, even a ‘supra sovereign’ institution 
like the ESM could be subject to liquidity 
problems. After all the ESM has only rather long-
term assets, namely the taxing power of the 
member states which have subscribed to its 
capital (and thus given the promise to pay a 
certain share of the liabilities of the ESM). 
It is thus entirely possible that one day even the 
ESM will not be able to place all the bonds it 
would like to issue. The ESM is likely to need to 
go to financial markets when risk aversion is 
high because that is when peripheral euro area 
countries are likely to experience difficulties 
themselves. During these times the market might 
also become more sceptical of the political 
commitment of the remaining core countries to 
support their partners and might not absorb the 
hundreds of billions of euro that might be 
needed quickly. This is the fundamental problem 
which remains unresolved so far. 
Summer of 2011: Anatomy of a crisis 
The problem created by the absence of a lender 
of last resort for the sovereign became 
particularly acute after the European Council of 
21 July 2011 – which was supposed to end the 
crisis by settling the Greek case with a mixture of 
generous long-term financing at low interest 
rates and some private-sector rescheduling and 
restructuring. The result of this summit was the 
opposite, however, as the crisis entered an even 
more acute phase with investors anticipating the 
quick unravelling of the July 2011 ‘solution’ (an 
anticipation that proved to be correct).  
The first-ever official announcement of a 
‘voluntary’ haircut on private investors in 
government bonds of an EU member country 
did not escape the markets’ notice, and they re-
evaluated all their holdings of all peripheral 
government debt. The European Council 
officially assured investors in July 2011 that 
Greece was an “exceptional and unique case” – 
an assurance that has been repeated several 
times since. However, investors were not fully 
convinced then (and remain skeptical today) 
because at least one other country (Portugal) is 
facing a fundamentally similar problem to that of 
Greece, at least in terms of over-consumption 
and foreign debt.1 Moreover, the size of the 
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haircut initially proposed (21%) was clearly 
unrealistic from the outset, and indeed it was 
increased to approximately 80% when Greece 
effectively defaulted in March 2012. To use an 
analogy: Investors who had so far believed that 
all swans are white had been shown a black 
swan. They cannot now be expected to forget 
that black swans exist. 
Regardless of what had been promised, the 
official announcement that private investors 
would be required to take losses on their 
holdings of Greek government bonds opened a 
sort of Pandora’s box, because this meant that 
other countries with high debt levels might end 
up in a similar situation. This created the 
potential for vicious feed-back loops. The 
argument is quite simple: even a rather high 
level of public debt would be sustainable if the 
government had to pay only a low interest rate, 
say, close to the compensation required on a 
riskless investment. However, the same level of 
debt might become unsustainable, forcing a 
country into default, if the borrowing cost is 
much higher. Hence many authors (most 
persuasively, de Grauwe, 2011) have argued that 
there might be multiple equilibria: if the market 
thinks the government can pay, it will be able to 
pay because its borrowing cost will be low. 
However, if the market thinks the government 
cannot pay, in practice it will not be able to pay 
because the high-risk premium requested will 
make the debt service so expensive that it will 
not be able to find the necessary resources. 
Doubts about the ability of a government to 
service its debt could thus become self-fulfilling.  
This mechanism is similar to the maturity mis-
match described earlier. But it works more 
slowly and becomes less likely the longer the 
maturity of government debt. The fact that high 
interest rates become a self-fulfilling prophecy of 
the ability of a country to service its debt offers a 
justification to provide fundamentally sound 
countries (those that are solvent at a reasonable 
risk premium) with financing at lower-than-
market rates. 
But the question that then arose in 2011 was 
simply whether there was enough money to 
cover everyone in the established crisis 
management mechanism. 
Although the Greek public might not appreciate 
it, it has received preferential treatment from the 
EU. Greece now has essentially all its financing 
needs arranged, and is assured of paying less 
than 4% on the new debt it is incurring. 
Moreover, given that the country has little 
private debt left, it is clear that even the public 
creditors will in all likelihood have to agree to a 
de facto haircut as well once the new programme 
goes off track. 
The two other countries with a programme, 
Ireland and Portugal, of course had to be treated 
‘equitably’. They have also been given more 
lenient terms (low interest rates and longer 
maturity) and the implicit assurance of further 
financing should they not be able to face the test 
of the markets in a few years. 
But while Greece, Ireland, and Portugal obtained 
more generous official long-term financing, 
Spain and Italy experienced a surge in their 
borrowing costs in the summer of 2011. At that 
point, the debt fears started to affect even the 
core, with peaks in the spreads for France and 
even the Netherlands. The reason for this 
contagion is quite simple: there is not enough 
highly rated fiscal power in the eurozone. 
Countries like Italy and Spain cannot be 
expected to provide billions of euro in credits to 
Greece (and Portugal and Ireland) at low rates 
(approximately 3.5%) when they themselves are 
paying much more. Europe’s leaders wanted to 
be generous to Greece, but the supply of cheap 
funds is limited. Not everybody can be served 
this way. 
The EFSF and the ESM can only deal 
with a peripheral crisis 
The eurozone’s permanent rescue fund, the ESM, 
which will complement the European Financial 
Stability Fund (EFSF) in mid-2012, cannot 
provide all countries with financing on the scale 
required so far by Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
It simply does not, and will not, have enough 
funds to undertake the massive bond purchases 
potentially required to stabilise markets. Even 
with a financing volume of €700 billion (as 
presently contemplated), it can provide 
emergency financial support only to small 
peripheral countries such as Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal. LIQUIDITY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EVEN THE ESM NEEDS IT | 4 
 
The existing programmes for these three 
countries (the GIP) amount to close to about €400 
billion, of which Greece alone needed almost 
€200 billion. The economies of Spain and Italy 
are more than ten times larger than that of 
Greece. This implies, as a rough rule of thumb, 
that about ten times 200 or about €2,000 billion 
might be needed in addition to the present 
commitments under a worst-case scenario. It is 
thus clear that increasing the rescue funds 
available by a few hundreds of billions of euro is 
not sufficient to deal with Spain and Italy.2 
Moreover any financing that relies on guarantees 
and other contributions from member states 
separately is vulnerable to a domino effect. The 
headline numbers on the size of the ESM are 
thus misleading. Countries facing high 
borrowing costs cannot effectively be relied 
upon to provide contributions to the rescue fund 
(whether the EFSF or the ESM). This does not 
matter that much as long as only small countries 
are in trouble. But if (when) the borrowing costs 
of large countries like Italy and Spain (which 
account together for about one-third of the 
eurozone) soar, only the core eurozone members 
would remain to back the EFSF. At this point, the 
debt burden on the core countries would become 
unbearable and even their own borrowing costs 
might increase.  
About 45% of the backing of the ESM comes 
from 'true' AAA countries (Germany, the 
Netherlands, etc.), another 35% from the 
periphery (Italy, Spain, the GIP) and a final 20% 
from France.   During a full-blown crisis 
engulfing Italy and Spain, only about 65% of the 
headline lending capacity might actually be 
available in the sense that the market would in 
such a case absorb, at most, bonds issues equal to 
the guarantees (called ‘callable capital’ in the 
ESM framework) of the 'core'. Should even 
France no longer be considered sufficiently 
creditworthy, the effective lending capacity of 
the ESM would be reduced to only a little over 
one half (45%) of its headline figure. Even 
increasing the headline funding of the ESM to 
€1,000 billion, as proposed recently by the 
OECD, would not be enough to deal with a full-
blown crisis. 
                                                      
2 See also Green (2012) for similar calculations. 
Events in 2011 showed this clearly. Even France 
experienced market pressure as doubts arose 
over its ability to deal with three contingent 
liabilities from the rescue of others on top of its 
already large existing stock of debt. At the peak 
of the crisis, even the EFSF had difficulties 
placing its bonds, and the yields on its bonds 
were for some time equal to those of France. The 
EFSF had thus to pay a considerable premium 
over the benchmark German paper. This is not 
surprising given that the EFSF was a new, 
untested legal construction, unknown to most 
investors outside Europe. The ESM will have a 
stronger legal framework and will be classified 
as an international institution.  But the existing 
stock of this class of borrowers at present 
amounts to a couple hundred billions of dollars. 
If the ESM had to raise €700 billion from the 
market, it would have to convince investors 
worldwide to double or triple their allocation to 
this investment class. This would be a challenge 
in normal times and might well turn out to be 
impossible when the ESM actually needs the 
funding, which is likely to be in an atmosphere 
of extreme risk aversion. 
This implies that a larger rescue fund is not the 
solution; if anything, it could accelerate the 
speed at which the dominos fall.3 The widely 
held view – that the firepower of the EFSF/ESM 
should be increased – does not make sense.4 
In the summer of 2011, the domino effect started 
to operate because financial markets do not wait 
for country after country to be downgraded. 
They tend to anticipate the endgame, or at least 
one potential scenario, namely the unravelling of 
the entire EFSF/ESM structure. Markets were 
caught between three seemingly inconsistent 
constraints: 1) little chance for a sizeable increase 
of the borrowing capacity of the EFSF, 2) little 
                                                      
3 See Giovannini & Gros (2011) for a calculation of the 
size of the EFSF/ESM needed to deal with Spain and Italy. 
4 This should be the case in particular for the country 
whose government has been most active in pushing for an 
increase in the funding for the ESM. Financial markets 
understood this risk and drove up borrowing costs for 
France – the core country that eventually lost its full AAA 
rating. If this process had continued, only Germany (and 
some of its smaller neighbours) would have been left to 
carry the whole burden. This would have been not only 
politically unacceptable but also economically impossible – 
the Italian government debt alone is equivalent to 
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chance for the introduction of Eurobonds and 3) 
great reluctance on the part of the ECB to engage 
in large-scale purchases of bonds of financially 
troubled governments. 
In the end, the ECB ended up buying large 
amounts of Spanish and Italian debt in the 
course of the summer of 2011 and it 
subsequently injected a generous dose of 
liquidity into the banking sector, but it was clear 
from the outset that the ECB would never 
provide funds on the scale required to permit all 
investors to exit from southern European 
government bond markets. 
The bank-government-debt snare 
The crisis of 2011 also illustrated once more that 
one cannot consider the issue of financing 
sovereigns in isolation from the state of financial 
markets in general. Banks in particular are linked 
to the sovereign and sometimes they represent 
the weakest link. There are two reasons for this:  
i)  Many banks hold large amounts of 
government debt 
ii)  The credit rating of banks usually falls along 
with that of their own sovereign. 
Bank holdings of government bonds create a 
problem when they are large. In all the 
peripheral countries, banks hold government 
bonds of their own government amounting to 
over 100% of their capital. This implies that any 
fall in the market value of government bonds 
will have a material impact on the value of the 
capital of the banks themselves. 
Moreover, the ratings agencies almost never give 
a bank a higher rating than its own government. 
The reason is simple: in any financial crisis only 
the government can save a bank. These two facts 
imply that anyone expecting a country’s 
downgrade would not be selling only 
government securities but also shares of its 
banks. This, in turn, increases the cost of capital 
for the banks, making them even weaker. 
Moreover, even stronger banks – which see their 
own share prices falling and credit-default 
spreads widening – react by refusing to provide 
the other banks with interbank liquidity. The 
breakdown in the interbank market, in turn, 
leads to a breakdown of the credit circuit, which 
kills growth. 
This was the dynamic that led to the severe 
recession experienced after the Lehman 
bankruptcy. During the worst crisis moments of 
2011, capital markets were anticipating the 
potential for a doomsday scenario with the 
economy going abruptly into a severe recession 
as the interbank market was breaking down and 
the public debt problems were growing further. 
These expectations might have well materialised 
had the ECB not addressed the issue in 
December of 2011 with the announcement of its 
new facility providing very long-term funding (3 
years) coupled with easier collateral rules. The 
breakdown of the interbank market was averted, 
but the massive liquidity injection by the ECB 
also lowered pressure on governments and 
banks to clean up their balance sheets. 
Obviously, a central bank is unable to effectively 
link area wide bridge financing with adjustment 
pressure for individual countries, a task for 
which the founders of the Bretton-Woods 
monetary system therefore built the International 
Monetary Fund. 
What needs to be done?  
The EMS (or EMF,5 a s  w e  p r e f e r  t o  c a l l  t h i s  
institution) has really two different tasks, which 
should be clearly separated by creating two 
departments, one dealing with programmes and 
one dealing with financial market stability. 
The first department would manage and fund 
existing adjustment programmes – and future 
ones, should the need arise. Experience has 
shown that sometimes a country cannot get back 
to the markets without debt reduction. In this 
case, the EMF needs to facilitate orderly debt 
restructuring preferably along the lines of the 
Brady Plan. Adjustment funding and help for 
debt restructuring involves considerable risk and 
thus need be fully backed by fiscal resources 
from member states. 
The second department, which we would call the 
financial stability department, would counter 
liquidity logjams in euro area sovereign bond 
markets through intervention in secondary 
markets. Smaller secondary market intervention 
in the case of limited liquidity gaps could be 
funded with own resources of the EMF (like the 
operations in the first department). However, in 
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the event of a big liquidity crunch, the EMF 
might need very large sums at very short notice. 
This can be achieved only if it has access to ECB 
facilities by borrowing against the government 
bonds it is purchasing on the secondary market 
as collateral. 
Assuming that the ECB insists on top quality in 
the assets it takes for collateral — assured, for 
instance, by a high rating — this would ensure 
that the EMF only lends in the event of a 
liquidity crunch and not when a country suffers 
insolvency. The decision to intervene to buy 
national government bonds to protect financial 
stability would be taken by the EMF, based on 
expert assessments and under the supervision of 
finance ministers, in conjunction with the ECB 
and the European Systemic Risk Board (as 
already foreseen in the Conclusions to the 21 July 
2011 European Council). Hence, the ECB, whose 
task is not to determine fiscal policy in specific 
countries, would again be able to look after price 
and financial stability for the euro area as a 
whole. 
If the ESM were to be registered as a (special) 
bank or ‘Monetary Financial Institution’ in 
Luxembourg, it would then have access to ECB 
funding under the same conditions as ‘normal’ 
banks, for which the central bank acts as a lender 
of last resort. This implies that even if risk 
aversion returns and the government debt of 
peripheral countries sells off again, the ESM 
would be able to act quickly and decisively 
without being limited by its ability to sell quickly 
hundreds of billions euro worth of bonds. The 
ECB would have the final say on whether or not 
it lends to the EMF, ensuring that it remains in 
control of the central bank money supply.  
This does not imply that support from the ECB 
should be used to finance the ongoing 
adjustment programmes in the GIP country 
group. Adjustment funding and help for debt 
restructuring would be carried out by the EMF 
with the financial endowment already decided, 
which should be sufficient for these purposes. 
Smaller secondary-market intervention in case of 
limited liquidity gaps could also be funded in 
the same way. Liquidity support from the ECB 
would be needed only as a last resort in case of a 
big liquidity crunch. But if the liquidity support 
is potentially available, no liquidity crunch is 
likely to materialise much in the way that 
deposit insurance has limited the likelihood of 
bank runs.  
Deposit insurance goes hand in hand with 
banking supervision. Any support for the 
government bond market of euro area members 
must also be accompanied by policy 
conditionality. But who should impose this 
conditionality?  
This should be the EMF, which would also be the 
proper institution to formulate and monitor the 
conditionality (obviously in conjunction with the 
European Commission and the IMF if necessary) 
which would have to go hand in hand with any 
support for member countries in difficulty, 
including buying bonds on the secondary 
markets. This was done implicitly by the ECB in 
the summer of 2011 when it used the threat of 
stopping its SMP (Securities Market Programme) 
in order to pressure the Italian government into 
undertaking reforms and fiscal adjustment. More 
recently, the very large liquidity injections via 
the longer-term refinancing operations (or 
LTRO) had no implicit conditionality attached. 
The LTRO was probably justified when it was 
launched, but it shows that a central bank has 
little choice when a crisis breaks but to venture 
into grey territory  in which fiscal and monetary 
policy overlap (see also Weidmann, 2012). 
There is no representation of the European 
taxpayer on the Governing Council of the ECB. 
This might lead to a tendency to be too much 
concerned about instability in financial markets 
and have too little regard for the interest of 
taxpayers (especially when the financial burden 
falls only on a few countries). 
Secondary market interventions by the EMF 
seem to be preferable over a system-wide 
injection of liquidity if the problem originates in 
the government debt market. Secondary market 
purchases below par have the advantage that 
they automatically provide for some ‘private 
sector involvement’ or PSI. If, during a panic, the 
EMF buys longer-term bonds at 70 to 80% of face 
value, some private sector participants will 
suffer some losses. The EMF should of course 
engage in these purchases only if it deems the 
country as fundamentally solvent.  
There is no danger to price stability from an 
‘ESM-bank’ as the ECB would still be able to 
control liquidity developments for the entire 7 | GROS & MAYER 
 
euro area.  Once financial markets have returned 
to normal it could simply stop its policy of full 
allotment. At this point any refinancing of the 
EMF would simply crowd out financing to other 
banks and thus not increase area-wide liquidity. 
With full allotment the ECB cannot control the 
aggregate amount of liquidity in the system, 
independently on whether or note the EMS has 
access to the ECB lending facilities as any normal 
bank. 
Backstopping the EFSF/EMS via the ECB – i.e. 
creating an EMF – would have the advantage 
that it leaves the management of public debt and 
external adjustment problems in the hand of the 
experts and finance ministries, but it provides 
them with the liquidity backstop that is needed 
when there is a generalised breakdown of 
confidence and liquidity.  
In short: during a confidence crisis the 
fundamental problem of banks and governments 
is always one of liquidity. This is exactly when a 
lender of last resort is most needed. The ECB is 
the only institution that can provide the required 
‘lending of last resort’ quickly and in a 
convincing quantity. But it needs the help of a 
fiscal institution, the EMF, to perform the role of 
lender of last resort without thwarting economic 
adjustment or jeopardising price stability. 
What are the alternatives? 
Some (e.g. de Grauwe (2012)) have argued that 
the ECB should simply resurrect its bond buying 
programme (called Securities Markets 
Programme or SMP).   The problems with this 
approach are that the ECB should be responsible 
for euro area wide price and financial stability, 
not with the conduct of national fiscal policy and 
the enforcement of conditionality at the national 
level. 
Another solution touted by some has been to 
establish joint and several liability for euro area 
countries’ debt.  Many have argued that the 
financing problems of the periphery would 
disappear with the introduction of Eurobonds.  
The danger here is that holding taxpayers fully 
and unconditionally liable for spending 
decisions taken in other countries would most 
likely turn into a poison pill for EMU. Political 
resistance against EMU would rise in the 
stronger countries, eventually probably leading 
to a break-up of EMU. Moreover, if the issuance 
of Eurobonds were limited to a part of national 
debt (say only 40-60% of GDP as proposed), 
highly indebted countries would immediately be 
forced into debt restructuring as they could no 
longer find buyers for the part of their debt only 
guaranteed nationally. Moreover, this approach 
would require a change in the EU treaties and 
would probably not be compatible with the 
German Constitution. 
Another variant of Eurobonds would be for all 
euro area countries to provide a ‘joint and 
several’ guarantee for the EFSF. This would still 
carry most of the political disadvantages 
mentioned above, but at least it would not create 
the additional problems of the blue/red bond 
proposal.  
Whatever the variant: Eurobonds can make 
sense only in a political union and even then 
only when debt levels are low. When starting 
debt levels are so high that the markets suspect a 
debt overhang, Eurobonds would amount to a 
large transfer of risk and of course strong 
expectations that future accumulations of debt 
will be treated in the same way. 
Legal obstacles? 
Is it legal? Opponents of our proposal argue that 
an ESM bank would contravene the Treaty, 
which prohibits ‘monetary financing’ of 
governments. As shown in more detail in the 
annex, however, this objection is not valid. In 
rediscounting government bonds bought on the 
secondary market, the ECB would treat the ESM 
only in the same way it treats all the banks, or 
‘MFIs’, that perform the same operation.   
Moreover, there exists a Council regulation that 
explicitly exempts two types of operations from 
the definition of ‘monetary financing’: balance-
of-payments assistance to non-euro member 
states and contributions to the IMF. Logically 
one should apply the same principle to the ESM 
since it does not make sense to apply the 
prohibition of monetary financing in the case of 
financial assistance to euro area members, but 
not to non-euro area members. Moreover, all 
IMF operations are ultimately financed by 
central banks and a large part of the IMF loans to 
the GIP have in reality been financed by euro 
area central banks, and thus effectively by the LIQUIDITY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EVEN THE ESM NEEDS IT | 8 
 
eurosystem. If this indirect financing of 
assistance to euro area countries via the IMF is 
legal, the financing of the same type of operation 
via the EMF should also be legal. 
Conclusions: No silver bullet 
Bringing EMU back to safe ground will of course 
only succeed if first deficits are reduced 
substantially and then debt levels (as a % of 
GDP) are brought down slowly as well. The 
financial crisis has vividly demonstrated that 
excessive debt loads, especially if combined with 
large deficits, cannot be financed in anything but 
the extremely benign markets that prevailed 
between 2000 and 2007. Countries that 
accumulate excessive debt will sooner or later 
experience their ‘Minsky moment’, when the 
rolling over of this debt becomes impossible. For 
a stable EMU, a long-term movement towards 
lower debt levels is a conditio sine qua non. The 
mechanisms to achieve this pre-condition have 
now been considerably strengthened through the 
tightening of the rules of the Stability Pact, the 
reverse qualified voting mechanism (under 
which a proposal by the Commission to sanction 
a country in excessive deficit is taken to be 
approved unless it is overruled by a qualified 
majority), and the so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’ 
which calls for member countries to adopt 
balanced budget rules at the national level. 
However, debt reduction takes a very long time, 
hence the need for an effective crisis-
management mechanism along the lines 
sketched above. In the absence of a mechanism 
with which to forestall a liquidity crisis, the other 
mechanisms will not be able to work, and EMU 
will fail. 
Our proposal will certainly not satisfy the purists 
who regard EMU as the re-birth of the gold 
standard. For the purists, our proposal amounts 
to monetary financing of government debt 
behind a thin veil. We would answer them that 
in the real world of today a pure gold-standard-
like arrangement will not work. In the current 
environment, the central bank needs to look after 
financial stability, which means that it needs to 
assume the role of a lender of last resort to banks 
and – because of the bank-government-debt 
nexus described above – also governments. The 
question is not whether, but how this role is 
performed. 
Safeguarding financial stability during a crisis 
might require large secondary market 
interventions. The responsibility for this decision 
should be taken by the finance ministers 
represented in the ESM who can put their 
taxpayers’ money on the line. But a liquidity 
backstop is needed to ensure that the ESM is able 
to perform this function even under extreme 
market conditions.  
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Annex: Legal Issues 
It has been argued that our proposal is not 
compatible with the prohibition of monetary 
financing of public bodies.  The discussion has 
become somewhat ideological with opponents 
alleging that given the EMS access to ECB 
financing would open the floodgates for 
unlimited financing and thus inflation.   
However, this is not the case. The financial 
stability department of the EMF would 
essentially perform the same function as many 
private sector investment funds located (in 
Luxembourg and elsewhere), which are 
recognised as ‘Monetary Financial Institutions’ 
(MFIs) by the ECB and thus have access to 
normal eurosystem refinancing. These funds 
usually specialise in investing in euro area 
government bonds.  The EMF could thus just 
create a special ‘sub’-vehicle (‘distressed debt’) 
whose purpose would be only to buy bonds on 
the secondary market. This vehicle could thus be 
operated just like any investment fund that 
invests in ‘distressed’ debt (i.e. buy when prices 
are low (yields are high)). This sub-vehicle 
would of course have to satisfy the the general 
eligibility criteria the Eurosystem uses for 
counterparties (i.e. minimum reserves, financial 
strength, operational criteria in contractual or 
regulatory arrangements with the ECB).  But this 
should be a problem. Moreover, the EMF would 
not extend credit to governments, it would only 
perform a function that has until been 
undertaken by the eurosystem itself through the 
SMP. There is thus no material reason why this 
activity should fall under the prohibition of the 
ECB to finance governments (Art. 123, TFEU). 
Article 123(1) states:  
Overdraft facilities or any other type of 
credit facility with the European Central 
Bank or with the central banks of the 
Member States (hereinafter referred to as 
“national central banks”) in favour of 
Union institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies, central governments, regional, 
local or other public authorities, other 
bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of Member States shall be 
prohibited, as shall the purchase directly 
from them by the European Central Bank 
or national central banks of debt 
instruments. 
The key legal point in this article hinges on the 
status of the ESM/EMF rather than on who 
ultimately benefits from the funding the ECB 
provides to the EMF. One side effect of the LTRO 
was that indeed banks could buy (or at least hold 
on to) government debt which had temporarily 
fallen in value. 
The key issue would then be whether the EMF 
falls under any of the categories listed in Article 
123, paragraph 1. Nowhere in Article 123(1) is 
there a reference to indirect funding, or the 
purpose for which access to ECB funding is to be 
made; there is simply a prohibition on certain 
classes of entity from receiving ECB monetary 
financing.6  
One could of course argue that since the EFSF is 
fully owned by governments it falls under the 
category of ‘public untertakings’. However, 
Article 123(1) did not prevent the European 
Investment Bank (an EU body, but with a 
distinct legal personality, registered in 
Luxembourg, like the EFSF and owned by 
member states and the Commission) from 
obtaining refinancing from the ECB. In 2009 the 
EIB was recognised as an “eligible counterparty” 
by the ECB with access to ECB refinancing “as 
any other counterparty”. As the ECB itself 
explains in a press release of 7 May 2009, this 
was “a natural complement to the EIB’s 
financing initiatives”.  The reason is that 
paragraph 2 of the article 123 TFEU provides an 
exemption: 
Article 123(2) reads:  
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly 
owned credit institutions which, in the 
context of the supply of reserves by 
central banks, shall be given the same 
treatment by national central banks and 
the European Central Bank as private 
credit institutions. 
This means that the EMF (or perhaps only its 
financial stability arm) could benefit from the 
exception in Article 123 paragraph 2, if it could 
                                                      
6 Those arguing against our proposal are coming from 
the perspective of what the ECB funding to the EFSF 
will be used for, i.e. indirect government financing, 
but neither Article 123 nor Council Regulation (EC) 
3603/93 mentions indirect financing – Article 123 
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be considered a publicly-owned ‘credit 
institution’.  Given that, as mentioned above, a 
number of investment funds are recognised as 
credit institutions there is no substantial reason 
why this should not be possible. 
We note that in Germany the bilateral loans to 
Greece have been channelled via the KfW 
(Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), which is also 
fully owned by the government and not a bank 
in the narrow sense of the word.  However, the 
KfW is an ‘eligible counterparty’ for the ECB as it 
is registered as an MFI. The KfW could thus 
refinance its lending to Greece (now over €10 
billion) via the ECB, if it wanted to. 
The fact that the ESM is a public law institution 
does not constitute a real obstacle. The case of 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) provides an 
important analogy here, as the EIB is certainly a 
public body (and publicly-owned). In the ECJ's 
case law, the EIB is legally deemed to be an 
autonomous entity, distinct from the EU but 
nonetheless a body intended to contribute to the 
attainment of the Union's objectives. As a result, 
it falls outside the category of entities listed in 
Article 123, paragraph 1. The same reasoning 
should apply to the ESM. 
Finally, the most direct way to ensure that access 
by the EFSF/EMF to the refinancing operations 
of the ECB does not encounter legal obstacles 
would be to simply make a small change in 
Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 
of 13 December 1993, which says: 
The financing by the European Central Bank 
or the national central banks of obligations 
falling upon the public sector vis-à-vis the 
International Monetary Fund or resulting 
from the implementation of the medium-term 
financial assistance facility set up by 
Regulation (EEC) No 1969/88 (4) shall not be 
regarded as a credit facility within the 
meaning of Article 104 of the Treaty. 
This Council regulation thus exempts both the 
financing of the IMF and the financial assistance 
to non-euro-area membership from the scope of 
Article 123.  
Given that financial assistance to euro area 
member states will soon also have a treaty base 
(via the addition to Article 136, which has 
already been agreed politically) there does not 
seem to exist any legal obstacle to treat 
differently the assistance to euro area member 
states. A change in this Council Regulation could 
be agreed quickly by the heads of state. 
From a substantive point of view it is difficult to 
understand why the prohibition of monetary 
financing should be applied to financial 
assistance to euro area members, but not to non-
euro area members. Moreover, those who 
oppose our proposal usually support a greater 
involvement of the IMF in euro area rescue 
operations. However, all IMF operations are 
ultimately finance by central banks and a large 
part of the IMF loans to the GIP have in reality 
financed by euro area central banks, and thus 
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